Survival, Essence, and Statue-Lump style Arguments for Coincident Objects

Abstract. In this paper, I propose an analysis of survival-statements (e.g. the statue cannot survive being smashed) in terms of statements about loss of properties and essence. Then, I show that, given my analysis, statue-lump style arguments for coincident objects involve some premises (i.e., survival-statements) that are controversial in the sense that those premises are not to be accepted as true without a robust justification. This will show that one doesn't have to feel threatened by statue-lump style arguments to accept the existence of coincident objects unless some robust justifications for the relevant controversial premises are given. (98 words)

Key Words. Survival. Essence. Statue-Lump, Coincident Objects, generic *vs.* objectual essence.

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